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1. INTRODUCTION
Abstract
An integration of deductive verification and model checking have been investi-
gated in numerous works over the last decade. We refer to the approaches, where
theorem proving was used to reduce verification problems to a form which al-
lows to apply model checking directly [21, 19]. We present a translation procedure
from finite state Reactive Logic (RL) [3] specifications of concurrent systems into
the SMV model checker. As RL specifications can use arbitrary data types we
demonstrate an application of data abstraction using a specification of communi-
cation protocol as an example. This paper was motivated by the results achieved
in the previous work on verification of medical guidelines by model checking [4].
The basis for this work is an implementation of the symbolic execution proof
strategy [1] for concurrent systems in the theorem prover KIV [2].
1 Introduction
The growing complexity of distributed and concurrent systems poses a difficult
challenge to developers and requires enhanced verification techniques. Automatic
verification techniques are very popular in the formal methods community and
in the industry as well. However, a well-known limitations to the efficiency of
the automatic verification is its applicability only to finite state models and
the exponential blow-up of the size of models. Nevertheless, a rather modest
amount of human intervention in terms of manually guided abstraction makes
possible to analyze industrial strength models very efficiently. Abstractions can
be computed in an automatic way or be manually constructed using deductive
reasoning.
The importance of deductive verification in computer science is widely recog-
nized. In particular, because of its features like universality, proof reusability,
application of common knowledge and possibility to deploy human creativity
during the proof process. Still, it can become inefficient proving interactively
things which can be more or less easily handled by a machine. In particular,
control-oriented properties of concurrent systems can be very efficiently ana-
lyzed by model checking.
Model checking is in particular a very efficient technique for the analysis of
reactive systems with fairly complex control flows. On the other hand, complex
or even unbounded data types in the specification must be previously handled by
various abstraction techniques before the model checking algorithm can actually
be applied. As data types in theorem proving can be arbitrarily specified we
focus on the interactive construction of suitable abstractions.
Our goal is to create an integrated verification environment which combines the
automation of model checking with the generality of theorem proving. Estab-
lishing of a link between both tools allows to combine the advantages of each
of them in different ways and with it increases the efficiency of a verification
process.
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1.1 Related Work
Many techniques have been developed in order to expand the limits of model
checking. A construction of property preserving abstractions proved to be an ef-
fective way dealing with state explosion or even infinite models. Methods, based
on ideas from the framework of abstract interpretation [8], have been developed.
In particular, the predicate abstraction technique [20] automatically constructs
(using theorem prover PVS) abstract state graphs based on a set of state pred-
icates p1, . . . , pn. [7] presents an algorithm that uses decision procedure to gen-
erate finite state abstractions of reactive systems without an exhaustive search
of the reachable abstract states (as in PVS method). The advantage of these
techniques is that they are fully automatic.
Alternatively, an abstract system can be generated interactively, using theorem
proving. In this case, the decrease in the automation is repaid by a flexibility in
finding the right abstraction and a richer set of available corrective actions in
case a proof fails. In [13] and [10] data abstraction is used for the verification
of infinite state systems by model checking, while theorem proving is used to
establish the correctness of an abstraction. Similar strategy was realized in [19]
in the context of Input/Output-Automata (IOA) which represent models of dis-
tributed processes. IOAs have been formalized in the theorem prover Isabelle. In
this approach safety properties were represented by IOA A (specification) and
the model of a system by IOA C (implementation). The verification goal of check-
ing traces(C) ⊆ traces(A) was achieved by introducing IOA B (abstraction)
and checking traces(C) ⊆ traces(B) (soundness of abstraction) interactively in
Isabelle and traces(B) ⊆ traces(A) by model checking.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary background
on the Reactive Logic (RL) in the theorem prover KIV. Section 3 defines a
translation procedure from the RL specification of a concurrent system in KIV
to the SMV model checker. Section 4 presents an application of data abstraction
technique to the producer-consumer example with infinite data types. Section 5
concludes and considers promissing directions for a future work.
2 Reactive Logic in KIV
KIV [2] is an integrated environment for system development using formal meth-
ods. KIV supports both the functional and the state-based approaches to specify
systems. Higher-order algebraic specifications of software and systems designs are
represented as directed acyclic graphs, called development graphs. Properties of
a design are verified by an interactive construction of proofs. KIV combines a
high degree of automation with an elaborate interactive proof engineering envi-
ronment. Support for the development of concurrent systems has recently been
added.
The Reactive Logic (RL) [3] was defined and implemented in KIV for the purpose
of deductive reasoning about and verification of concurrent systems. The RL
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syntax and the semantics of programs is close to SPL [22], however, it is more in
the style of the Interval Temporal Logic [18], where programs and formulas can
be mixed. In RL the behavior of concurrent systems is described using parallel
programs and their properties are formulated in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
A state of a system is encoded in first-order logic using variables. We distinguish
between static variables v (represented using lowercase), which do not change
their value over time, and dynamic variables V . The most distinctive attribute of
this logic are double-primed variables. A primed variable V ′ represents the value
of V after a system transition, the double-primed variable V ′′ stores the value
after an environment transition. System and environment transition alternate,
while V ′′ is equal to the value of V in the successive state. This feature is
introduced in order to get a compositional semantics for interleaving operator
||i.
We refer to [3] for a detailed definition of RL syntax and semantics.
3 Generating Finite-State Model
Usually finite state transition systems are represented using Kripke models. In
the context of concurrent programs, in order to construct a Kripke model for a
given concurrent system, we should provide the set of system variables V as well
as the first order formulas I and T specifying the set of initial states and the
transition relation respectively.
ϕinit, [α], ψenv ⊢ χ
Fig. 1. Proof obligation in KIV: precondition, program, environment assumption ⊢
temporal property
Consider a temporal proof obligation in the theorem prover KIV, see Fig. 1.
In RL programs and formulas can be mixed as well as complex abstract data
types can be used. Therefore, we must put some restrictions on the precondition
ϕinit and the program [α], see Definition 1, in order to be able to construct
the corresponding finite-state model directly (i.e. without any use of abstrac-
tion) and automatically from the underlying specification specification in KIV.
We intentionally abandon the option of using well-established abstractions for
program analysis at this point, e.g. the method of predicate abstraction which
uses decision procedures for the automatic construction of an abstraction for a
given program. We are investigating an option of an interactive way of an ab-
straction construction in the the theorem prover KIV using deductive reasoning.
The theorem prover is used to prove a homomorphic correspondence between
the concrete and the abstract model. Therefore, we assume that a model of a
concurrent system is already finite, i.e. satisfies certain assumptions.
Definition 1 (Assumptions). We assume that:
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– all program variables have finite domain and are correspondingly initialized
in the precondition ϕinit, e.g. ϕinit ≡ N = 0 ∧ M = 1
– programs contain no recursive procedure calls
– as ||s,||i are associative operators, we assume that program P = P1|| . . . ||Pn
(flat hierarchy)
Given a proof obligation, see Fig. 1, which fulfils the assumptions from the
Definition 1. In order to find out by model checking whether the concurrent
program [α] satisfies the LTL property χ under the environment assumption
ψenv, we should construct a corresponding finite-state model. This finite-state
model is specified by providing a set of system variables V (which implicitly
defines the state space) as well as first order formulas I and T (initial states
and transition relation). The formula I can be straightforward derived from
the precondition ϕPL. The details on construction of V and T are described
in 3.1 and 3.2. In case of RL, the formula T is defined as a composition of
two relations Ts and Te which model the transitions of a concurrent program
and of an environment respectively, i.e. T := Ts ; Te. This corresponds to the
semantics of RL, where the TL step is defined as a successive combination of the
step of a system (modelled by a concurrent program) followed by the step of an
environment (modelled by an environment assumption). Next we will describe
an approach to a construction of Ts (for a given program [α]) and of Te (for a
given environment assumption expressed by an LTL formula ψenv).
3.1 Programs
For the construction of Ts we use the approach presented in the books by Manna
and Pnuelli [16] and by Clarke, Grumberg and Peled [6] (Chapter 2), which is
based on the idea of labelling of statements in a program. A translation procedure
C is defined, that takes the text of a labeled program P and transforms it into
first order formula Ts, where Ts represents the set of transitions of the program.
Further, the definition of C is extended for the interleaved operator ||i. Also, a
labelling transformation of a program P into a labeled program PL is defined.
The definition of a labeling transformation of a program is based on the assump-
tion that each statement in a program has a unique entry point and a unique
exit point. As in sequential programs the exit point of a statement is equal to
the entry point of the following statement, it is sufficient for the labeling trans-
formation to attach labels only for the entry points of statements of a program
P . Further, labels for the entry and exit points of P must be provided. We as-
sume that no two attached labels are identical. For an arbitrary program P the
labeling transformation to PL is defined as follows, see Definition 2:
Definition 2 (labeled program PL). Consider the following cases:
– if P is a basic statement (e.g. P is x := e, skip, await), then PL = P .
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– if P = P1 ; P2, then P
L = PL1 ; l : P
L
2 .
– if P = if c then P1 else P2, then P
L = if c then l1 : P
L
1 else l2 : P
L
2 .
– if P = while c do P1, then P
L = while c do l1 : P
L
1 .
– if P = P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn, then P
L = l1 : P
L
1 ||l2 : P
L
2 || . . . ||ln : P
L
n .
In following, we assume that P as well as all Pi are already labeled programs
with entry and exit points labeled l, l′ and li, l
′
i respectively. For each process Pi
we introduce a special variable pci called program counter that ranges over the
set of program labels.
The translation procedure C has three parameter: the entry label l, the labeled
program P and the exit label l′. For a given concurrent program P , the cor-
responding transition relation Ts is defined as C(l, P, l
′), where C(l, P, l′) is a
disjunction of all possible transitions. A single transition is represented by a
conjunction which is true whenever the transition is enabled and false other-
wise. C is recursively defined for each program construct, see Definition 3.
Definition 3 (translation procedure C). In order to define C(l, P, l′) con-
sider the following cases for P :
– C(l, x := e, l′) ≡ pc = l ∧ pc′ = l′ ∧ x′ = e ∧ same(V \{x, pc}) 1
– C(l, skip, l′) ≡ pc = l ∧ pc′ = l′ ∧ same(V \{pc})
– C(l,await c, l′) ≡ (pc = l ∧ pc′ = l′ ∧ c ∧ same(V \{pc})) ∨
(pc = l ∧ pc′ = l ∧ ¬c ∧ same(V ))
– C(l, P1 ; l
′′ : P2, l
′) ≡ C(l, P1, l
′′) ∨ C(l′′, P2, l
′)
– C(l, if c then l1 : P
L
1 else l2 : P
L
2 , l
′) ≡
(pc = l ∧ pc′ = l1 ∧ c ∧ same(V \{pc})) ∨
(pc = l ∧ pc′ = l2 ∧ ¬c ∧ same(V \{pc})) ∨ C(l1, P1, l
′) ∨ C(l2, P2, l
′)
– C(l,while c do l1 : P
L
1 , l
′) ≡
(pc = l ∧ pc′ = l1 ∧ c ∧ same(V \{pc})) ∨
(pc = l ∧ pc′ = l′ ∧ ¬c ∧ same(V \{pc})) ∨ C(l1, P1, l)
– C(l, l1 : P
L
1 ||il2 : P
L
2 ||i . . . ||iln : P
L
n , l
′) ≡
fairSched ∧
∨n
i=1(¬blki ∧ C(li, Pi, l
′
i))
– C(l, l1 : P
L
1 ||sl2 : P
L
2 ||i . . . ||sln : P
L
n , l
′) ≡∧n
i=1 C(li, Pi, l
′
i)
In contrast to [16] and [6], the translation procedure C in Def. 3 treats asyn-
chronous parallel operator ||i in a different way, i.e. a process is scheduled only if
it is not blocked (¬blki holds)
2. Also, the interleaved operator ||i in RL weakly
fair, i.e. if a process is infinitely often not blocked, eventually it will be scheduled.
1 same(V ) ⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ V. x′ = x
2 A process is blocked iff it stalls at a synchronization point await c, i.e. the condition
c is currently false
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3.2 Environment
The most commonly used environment assumption is one where the environment
is assumed to be not modifying the system variables, e.g. ψenv ≡ 2 N
′′ = N ′.
Another kind of frequently used assumptions are liveness properties which state
that an event eventually occurs, e.g. 3 Push′′ ↔ true.
As we mentioned before, the purpose of introducing double primed variables in
RL is to make the logic more suitable for the compositional reasoning about
concurrent systems. It is possible, for example, to consider separately only one
component of a concurrent system for the verification, while replacing the other
parts by their abstractions in form of LTL properties. These LTL properties are
put in the environmet assumptions during the verification.
Therefore, in general, we can get an arbitrary LTL formula ψenv describing an
environment behavior, i.e. a relationship between double primed variables ν′′ and
primed variables ν′. For example, ψenv can contain propositions p(ν
′′) ∈ L(ψenv)
(here L(ψenv) represents the set of propositions which occur in ψenv) which have
form ν′′ = τ(ν′1, .., ν
′
n), where ν and νi represent program variables and τ is a
function constructed using operations like addition, subtraction etc.
In this Section we describe how given an environment assumption ψenv a cor-
responding environment transition relation can be constructed. We use an al-
gorithm of Gerth, Peled, Vardi and Wolper [11] for translating an LTL path
formula into a generalized Bu¨chi automaton using depth-first search. This algo-
rithm is designed to produce small automata and avoids the exponential blowup
that can occur in their construction whenever possible. Further, a simple trans-
lation from a generalized Bu¨chi automaton to a Bu¨chi automaton is performed.
After the Bu¨chi automaton, see Definition 4, for a given LTL formula ψenv is
constructed, we have to translate it into the first order formula Te representing
the corresponding transition relation.
Definition 4 (Bu¨chi automaton). A = 〈Q, I,→, F 〉, where:
– Q is a finite set of states
– I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states
– → ⊆ Q×Q is the transition relation
– F ⊆ 2Q is the set of accepting states.
An execution A is an infinite sequence σ = q0q1q2 . . . such that q0 ∈ I and
∀i ≥ 0.gi → qi+1. An accepting execution σ is an execution such that, ∀q ∈
F. q ∈ inf(σ) 3.
Consider the LTL formula 2(p → (rUq))4 as an example. The corresponding
Bu¨chi automaton is shown on Fig. 2. In order to translate this automaton into
Te we introduce an additional state variable s ranging over {s0, s1}:
3 q appears infinitely often in the execution σ
4 as mentioned above, p, q, r abbreviate some relationships between primed and double
primed variables, e.g. N ′′ = N ′
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Fig. 2. Bu¨chi automaton for 2(p→ (rUq))
(s = s0 ∧ s
′ = s0 ∧ (¬p ∨ p ∧ q) ∨
s = s0 ∧ s
′ = s1 ∧ p ∧ r ∧ ¬q ∨
s = s1 ∧ s
′ = s1 ∧ r ∧ ¬q ∨
s = s1 ∧ s
′ = s0 ∧ q) ∧ fair(s = s0 ∨ s = s1)
Fig. 3. Formula representing Bu¨chi automaton on Fig. 2
The assumption fair(s = s0 ∨ s = s1) requires that s = s0 ∨ s = s1 holds
infinitely often on every trace. This fairness constraint models the acceptance
condition for the Bu¨chi automaton on Fig. 2.
3.3 Encoding into SMV
As we previously used SMV [14] model checker (Cadence SMV) for the verifi-
cation of medical guidelines [4] and it proved to be a very efficient tool, we also
decided to use it for the model checking of RL programs. In particular, it pro-
vides such useful for our purposes constructs like TRANS and INVAR. The first
one allows to encode a transition relation of state variables by a formula, e.g. see
Fig. 3. The INVAR statement restricts the state space only to states satisfying a
given condition. In order to model the weak fairness of the interleaved operator
||i the FAIRNESS construct of SMV language is used. This construct allows
to restrict a model only to traces where the declared constraint holds infinitely
often. For example, by declaring FAIRNESS blk1 | arbiter=1 we exclude those
possible traces where the first process is infinitely often (in the weak sense) not
blocked and still is not scheduled.
Consider, as an example, the Fisher’s mutual exclusion protocol modelled by
concurrent programs, see Fig. 4.
According to the translation schema presented in 3.1 and 3.2 the formulas Ts
and Te
5 modelling the system step and the environment step respectively are
5 the set of accepting states of the corresponding Bu¨chi automaton is empty
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P = 1, Q = 0, R = 0, (: initial values :)
[mutex], (: parallel program :)
2 (P ′′ = P ′ ∧ Q′′ = Q′ ∧ R′′ = R′) (: environment assumption :)
⊢ 2 (Q 6= 1 ∨ R 6= 1) (: property to prove :)
where
mutex ≡
while true do begin
await P = 1;
(: critical section :)
Q := 1;
(: noncritical section :)
Q := 0, P := 0;
end
while true do begin
await P = 0;
(: critical section :)
R := 1;
(: noncritical section :)
R := 0, P := 1;
end
i
Fig. 4. Proof obligation in KIV for the Fisher’s mutual exclusion protocol safety prop-
erty.
automatically generated for this example:
Ts ≡ (¬blk1 ∧ ((pc1 = l11 ∧ pc
′
1 = l12 ∧ true ∧ same({P,Q,R})) ∨
(pc1 = l11 ∧ pc
′
1 = l15 ∧ ¬ true ∧ same({P,Q,R})) ∨
(pc1 = l12 ∧ pc
′
1 = l13 ∧ P = 1 ∧ same({P,Q,R})) ∨
(pc1 = l12 ∧ pc
′
1 = l12 ∧ ¬ (P = 1) ∧ same({P,Q,R})) ∨
(pc1 = l13 ∧ pc
′
1 = l14 ∧ Q
′ = 1 ∧ same({P,R})) ∨
(pc1 = l14 ∧ pc
′
1 = l11 ∧ Q
′ = 0 ∧ P ′ = 0 ∧ same({R})) ∨
(pc1 = l15 ∧ pc
′
1 = l15 ∧ same({P,Q,R})) ∧ same({pc2})) ∨
(¬blk2 ∧ (. . . ) ∧ same({pc1})),
where blk1 ≡ pc1 = l12 ∧ ¬(P = 1), blk2 ≡ pc2 = l22 ∧ ¬(P = 0)
Te ≡ s = s0 ∧ s
′ = s0 ∧ P
′′ = P ′ ∧ Q′′ = Q′ ∧ R′′ = R′
After the translation of the program [mutex] and the environment assumption
2(P ′′ = P ′ ∧ . . . ) into formulas the corresponding SMV model is generated.
For reasons of better readability of the generated SMV model we encode the
transition relation Ts indirectly using case construct. On the other hand, the
transition relation Te of an environment is directly encoded into SMV using
TRANS construct.
In RL a temporal step consists of two substeps (system step and environment
step) which are executed sequentially, i.e. first the value of primed variables ν′
is computed and then the value of double primed variables depending on the
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module main(blk1,blk2,Pp,Qp,Rp) {
p : {1,0}; output pp : {1,0}; q : {1,0}; output qp : {1,0};
r : {1,0}; output rp : {1,0};
init(p) := 1; init(q) := 0; init(r) := 0;
arbiter : {ini,no,1,2};
pc1 : {l1x1,l1x2,l1x3,l1x4,l1x5}; pc2 : {l2x1,l2x2,l2x3,l2x4,l2x5};
init(pc1) := l1x1; init(pc2) := l2x1;
init(arbiter) := ini; next(arbiter) := {no,1,2};
output blk1 : {0,1}; blk1 := pc1=l1x2 & !p=1 | pc1=l1x5;
output blk2 : {0,1}; blk2 := pc2=l2x2 & !!p=1 | pc2=l2x5;
case {
arbiter=1 : case {
pc1=l1x1 & 1 : next(pc1) := l1x2;
pc1=l1x1 & !(1) : next(pc1) := l1x5;
pc1=l1x2 & p=1 : next(pc1) := l1x3;
pc1=l1x2 & !(p=1) : next(pc1) := pc1;
pc1=l1x3 : next(pc1) := l1x4;
pc1=l1x4 : next(pc1) := l1x1;
1 : next(pc1) := pc1;
}
1 : next(pc1) := pc1;
}
... /* case for arbiter=2 : transition relation of pc2 */
case {
arbiter=1 : case {
pc1=l1x4 : pp := 0;
1 : pp := p;
}
arbiter=2 : case
{
pc2=l2x4 : pp := 1;
1 : pp := p;
}
1 : pp := p;
}
... /* definitions of Qp and Rp */
INVAR
!(blk1=1 & arbiter=1) & !(blk2=1 & arbiter=2) &
!((blk1=0 | blk2=0) & arbiter=no);
s : {1}; init(s) := {1};
TRANS ((s=1) & next(s)=1 & next(r)=rp & next(q)=qp & next(p)=pp);
FAIRNESS (blk1 | arbiter=1) & (blk2 | arbiter=2);
assert G !(q=1 & r=1);
}
Fig. 5. The SMV model excerpt for the mutex protocol
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assignment of primed variables. We modelled this behavior by introducing for
each variable v an output parameter output : vp and a state variable v. The
value of vp in each step step represents the value of the primed variable v
′ and
is computed from the current values of the state variables in an unambiguous
way due to the definition of Ts. The value of v
′′ is defined by next(v) (the value
of the state variable v in the next step) due to the definition of Te.
4 Data Abstraction
Usually, RL specifications contain complex and infinite data types. Unlike the-
orem proving, which is very suitable for reasoning about abstract data types,
model checking puts restrictions on the used data types, e.g., they should be
finite. Consequently, the first step in an application of model checking to the
specifications of concurrent systems in a theorem prover is to transform them
to a finite state form. This step typically involves some kind of abstraction.
As we focus on the abstraction of the data part of a model (model checking is
quite efficient in handling control part) we will use data abstraction [12, 5, 9, 13]
technique.
The soundness of verification techniques involving abstractions essentially de-
pends on the property preservation. Whenever the abstract system satisfies a
formula, the concrete system also satisfies this formula. In our framework we are
dealing with LTL formulas. Since LTL formulas are interpreted over all possible
traces of a system (the system satisfies LTL formula ⇔ LTL formula is satisfied
on every trace of the system), it is sufficient to show that for every trace of the
concrete systemM there exists a corresponding trace in the abstract systemM ′.
This correspondence is encoded as a relation between data types in the concrete
system and their correspondents in the abstract system. These ideas are formal-
ized by the notion of simulation relation [17]. Assuming that M ′ simulates M ,
then according to [5] M ′ preserves ACTL (therewith LTL) properties of M .
As in our case M is defined by a parallel program operating on variables, we
define M ′ by providing a surjective abstraction mapping α from concrete to
abstract domains. Usually, it is defined as an identity mapping for finite do-
mains and an equivalence relation for infinite domains respectively. Further, for
each function fc in the concrete program an abstract counterpart fa should be
provided. Abstract functions fa introduce nondeterminism which is modeled by
nondeterministic operations, i.e. set-valued functions. In this context, our orig-
inal requirement on M ′ to “mimic” M can be formulated by using a notion of
homomorphism, see Def. 5. In fact, if α is proven to be an homomorphism with
respect to the concrete functions fc then it defines a simulation relation between
M and M ′ and therefore is a safe abstraction [15].
Definition 5 (Homomorphic mapping). An abstraction mapping α is an
homomorphism with respect to functions fc and their abstract counterparts fa if
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following holds:
∀x¯. α(fc(x¯)) ∈ fa(α(x¯))
In following, we will demonstrate an application of data abstraction followed by
a formal proof of simulation relation in the theorem prover KIV using a concrete
example.
4.1 Example: Producer-Consumer
Consider an asynchronous concurrent system consisting of two processes: pro-
ducer, which generates random values, and consumer, which receives these val-
ues, see Fig. 6. The communication is abstracted by a shared variable CH.data
and works according to the handshake procedure: the receiver is informed by
the signal CH.sig that something is sent and acknowledges a reception by set-
ting the signal CH.ack (a signal is sent by negating the corresponding variable).
Furthermore, both processes store the messages which they have sent/received
in the queues PLIST/CLIST. Initially, the queues are empty, channel contains
some random data and both signals are set to true. The property we want to
prove argues that no messages are lost, no doubles are produced by the channel
and the order of messages is preserved. It is formulated as a safety property: the
consumer queue CLIST is always a prefix of the producer queue PLIST .
PLIST = [ ], CLIST = [ ], CH = mkch(A, true, true),
[prodcon],
2 (CH ′′ = CH ′ ∧ A′′ = A′ ∧ PLIST ′′ = PLIST ′ ∧ CLIST ′′ = CLIST ′)
⊢ 2 (CLIST ⊆ PLIST )
where
prodcon ≡
while true do begin
await CH.sig = CH.ack;
A := [?];
PLIST := PLIST +A;
CH := mkch(A,¬CH.sig, CH.ack);
end
while true do begin
await CH.sig 6= CH.ack;
A := CH.data;
CLIST := CLIST +A;
CH := mkch(CH.data, CH.sig,¬CH.ack);
end
i
Fig. 6. Proof obligation in KIV for the Producer-Consumer example.
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Although, this example has a quite simple control structure, it can not be di-
rectly model checked as its specification contains two infinite data types: elem
(unspecified message type) and list (lists of elements with arbitrary lengths).
The abstraction, we will use, is motivated by following observations done by an
informal analysis of the system:
– property actually does not care about a concrete value of the variable A as
long as it is delivered on time
– in every step of an execution the lengths of both queues are either equal or
#MB.pli = 1 +#MB.cli.
The RL specification of Producer-Consumer example uses following sorts: bool,
elem, list and channel. Here, sorts bool (finite) and channel (structure) pose no
problem with respect to finiteness, while sorts elem and list should be treated
by an abstraction. Instead of defining abstract sorts elema and lista followed by
a definition of mappings α : elem → elema and α : list → lista we follow a bit
different way of defining a data abstraction. First, we transform the specification
by grouping all variables with infinite domain in a tuple, e.g. variables PLIST,
CLIST and A are bundled in [PLIST,CLIST,A], and define a new data type
Tuple which is a structure where each place corresponds to some infinite variable
in program6. Next, we introduce a new program variable T : Tuple and replace
all occurrences of bundled variables v in a program by T.v. Now we will define
an abstraction mapping α for data type Tuple. The corresponding abstract data
type Tuplea has a finite domain which contains symbolic values. The variable T
in the concrete program is mapped to Ta : Tuplea in the abstract program. All
assignments T.v := τ in the concrete program are mapped on assignments Ta :=
α(τ) in the abstract program. For each function fc in the concrete program which
is applied to T.v, i.e. fc is applied to T , we define an abstract function fa which
is applied just to Ta, e.g. PLIST := PLIST + A is transformed into T.PLIST :=
T.PLIST + T.A and mapped on Ta := pinserta(Ta) in the abstract program.
Special case here is the nondeterministic assignment A := [?] to variable A,
which is mapped on the abstract function getrandomA : Tuplea → Tuplea.
The overall definition of the abstraction mapping α for the Producer-Consumer
example is shown in Fig. 7.
As the data type channel, which describes a structure, has infinite data type elem
as a component, it is mapped by α not exactly on itself (as bool for example).
Abstract version of channel has component of type Tuplea instead of elem.
According to the definition of the mapping α an abstract program is constructed,
see Fig. 8.
The temporal property 2PLIST ⊑ CLIST can be rewritten as 2 ∃z. PLIST =
CLIST + z. Obviously our abstraction is too coarse in order to represent the
⊑ function in an appropriate way. So we show a stronger temporal property
6 Surely, infinite variables in a program can be grouped in several disjoint tuples
depending on an abstraction which is used.
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α(mkTuple(x, y,A)) =
8<
:
Equal if x = y
Shorter1 if x = y +A
⊥ otherwise
pinserta(Ta) =

{Shorter1} if Ta = Equal
{Equal,⊥} otherwise
cinserta(Ta) =

{Equal} if Ta = Shorter1
{Shorter1,⊥} otherwise
getrandomA(Ta) =

{Ta} if Ta = Equal
{⊥, Shorter1} otherwise
Fig. 7. Definition of the abstraction mapping α and of the corresponding abstract
functions
2 PLIST = CLIST ∨ PLIST = CLIST +A which can be directly mapped on
2 Ta = Equal ∨ Ta = Shorter1.
Ta = Equal, CHa = mkch(Ta, true, true),
[prodcon],
2 (CH ′′ = CH ′ ∧ T ′′a = T
′
a)
⊢ 2 (Ta = Equal ∨ Ta = Shorter1)
where
prodcon ≡
while true do begin
await CH.sig = CH.ack;
Ta := getrandomA(Ta);
Ta := pinserta(Ta);
CHa := mkch(Ta,¬CH.sig, CH.ack);
end
while true do begin
await CH.sig 6= CH.ack;
Ta := CHa.data;
Ta := cinserta(Ta);
CHa := mkch(CHa.data, CH.sig,¬CH.ack);
end
i
Fig. 8. Abstract finite state program and corresponding proof obligation.
In order to assure that an abstraction mapping α is safe with respect to LTL
properties we have to prove that it is an homomorphism with respect to used
functions f in a concrete program and their abstractions fa in the abstract
program, see Def. 5. For example, for function pinsert : Tuple → Tuple (cor-
responds to PLIST := PLIST + A) we have to show that ∀T. h(pinsert(T )) ∈
pinserta(h(T )). All these proofs were automatically accomplished in KIV using
the standard set of heuristics (in particular automatic case splitting as abstract
13 of 16
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
functions usually represent big case distinctions). In the first try, we defined
pinserta(Ta) for the case Ta 6= Equal to be equal {⊥}. By proving the homo-
morphism property for the abstract function pinserta we discovered an error :
by inserting an element in PLIST we can make this list equal CLIST. Therefore,
the right definition of pinserta(Ta) for the case Ta 6= Equal is {⊥, Equal}, see
Def. 7.
After an abstract finite state program is constructed, we can use the automatic
method from Section 3 and start the SMV model checker. Automatic proof of the
abstract property 2 (Ta = Equal∨Ta = Shorter1) takes virtually no time (2000
BDD nodes were allocated) and the property is proven to hold for the abstract
model, which implies that original property 2 CLIST ⊑ PLIST holds in the
original model as well. Practical experiences from the verification of Producer-
Consumer example have shown that the most effort was put in finding an idea
of an abstraction α as well as defining abstract functions pinserta, cinserta.
Following table gives an overview of model checking results (all experiments
were carried out on a AMD Athlon Dual Core with two 2.4 GHz processors and
4GB RAM memory):
Example code lines allocated BDD nodes SMV time
mutex (generated SMV model) 83 634 0.01s
mutex (classical SMV model) 43 421 0.01s
prodcon 125 2256 0.01s
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a technique which combines model checking and theorem
proving within the Reactive Logic framework in the theorem prover KIV. It
allows to prove arbitrary linear time temporal logic properties of concurrent sys-
tems. We define a translation procedure from finite state RL specifications into
finite state transition systems which are subsequently encoded into SMV syntax.
Here, we extended the classical translation procedure for parallel programs [16,
6] to RL which supports the concept of an environment.
As typical RL specifications contain arbitrary infinite data types, e.g. infinite
lists, we demonstrated an application of the well-known data abstraction tech-
nique, which allows to bring specifications to a finite form. This kind of abstrac-
tion is an informal activity which requires a thorough understanding of a model,
i.e. it requires a reasonable human interaction effort. Though, all generated proof
obligations are automatically discharged in the theorem prover KIV, in case a
proof fails, human interaction is required in order to adjust the abstraction map-
ping. The proof of a trace inclusion does not prevent an abstract model from
containing spurious counter examples. In fact, there exists a trade-off between
defining as lazy abstraction as possible (which results in nondeterminism and
spurious counter examples) and defining a very precise abstraction (state explo-
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sion). Therefore, it would be very helpful to enable an automatic simulation of
generated counter examples on the concrete model, in order to detect spurious
ones.
By introducing double primed variables, which enables to replace some parts
of a model by an environment assumption, Reactive Logic is very suitable for
compositional reasoning. It looks like very promising to apply our method to
larger practical examples in combination with compositional strategies.
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